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 The politicization of the Nabi Musa festival during the Palestine Mandate is a well-known 
fact, yet other Arab Palestinian festivals knew a similar transformation in the same context. Such 
was the case of the  Mawlid al-nabawī (birthday of the Prophet Muhammad). Arab nationalists 
meant it to evolve into a communal festival for all the Arabs of Palestine. Yet, for mainly 
denominational, geographical and political reasons, the attempt met with diverse success throughout 
the territory of the Palestine Mandate.  
 Attendance to public festivities remained decidedly Muslim in character. Repeated appeals 
to Christian participation were of little avail. Yet the attempts to include Christian Arabs in the 
festival throw light on Arab nationalist ideologies in Palestine at the time : from that point of view, 
the Prophet Muhammad stands out as an axiological inspiration, regardless of denominational 
boundaries. 
 In 1937, political mobilization on the occasion of the  Mawlid al-nabawī peaked. Yet even 
then, attendance was greatest in Gaza and Acre, places where the festival was traditionally 
important. Furthermore, the degree of mobilization, varying from place to place, seems to reflect the 




 In the issue of May 21st 1937 of the Palestinian Arab newspaper Filasṭīn, on the eve of the   
Mawlid al-nabawī  (the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, hereafter referred to as Mawlid), one 
of the editorialists complained that the director of the Department of Education of the Palestine 
Mandate had forbidden Arab children from taking part in the festivals linked to the occasion which 
were taking place. The Mawlid was an official holiday and, as the schools were to be closed, 
schoolchildren were to be left to the care of their parents. Given this, the journalist asked, what did 
the director think he was doing, meddling in the private lives of families? He further stated that  
“ The Prophet's birthday is the equivalent of the Christmas holiday for the English, and we 
leave it to the Director of the Department of Education to imagine what would ensue if 
someone were to forbid schoolchildren in England from taking part in Christmas and its 
festivities; we wonder what the goal of such a man would be. “ 
 Indeed, considering that no Arab in Palestine would prevent the said Director from sending 
his own children to church on Christmas Eve, the author was in a good position to question the 
purpose of the measure. He concluded by stating that it was the religious and patriotic [waṭanī] duty 
for Muslim as well as Christian schoolchildren to take part in themi. 
 The comparison between the Mawlid, which was the occasion of conferences and rallies 
with clear political undertones among the Arab community in Palestine, and Christmas, mostly a 
family holiday, may seem less than apt; the details of the anecdote raise a number of questions 
about the meaning of the Mawlid e.g. what actually is a religious festival that requires attendance 
for both Muslims and Christians? While the general religious nature of the festival may be obvious, 
what made it ”patriotic “, and what did ”patriotic “ mean in a colonized and conflict-ridden country 
such as Palestine? In addition, how big was the festival actually becoming, such that its importance 
justified such a prohibition? It is not sufficient to point out that May 1937 was a brief moment of 
calm in the midst of three years of civil revolt by the Palestinian Arab population, and that the 
British authorities were wary of popular religious gatherings that might be used to express political 
discontent. Whatever misgivings the administration may have had as to the state of law and order 
during the festivals, these were not altogether cancelled. The dynamics of festivals may be 
saturated with politics at times, but there is much more to them than sheer instrumentality. While 
there were definite declarations, focusing on the potential that mobilizations throughout Palestine 
on that holiday might help foster a Palestinian Arab national festival, the Mawlid was never meant 
to be something akin to the Quatorze-Juillet, the Fourth of July. Establishing a national festival, I 
would argue, has to do with national sociability and the presence of a national idea throughout a 
territory; in the accounts of the Mawlid, there is, however, an ever-present tension between national 
aims and diverse forms of parochialism – especially localism and distinctions between Muslims and 
Christians, as well as factionalism.  In the realms of intellectual debate, at conferences, and in the 
pressii, there was a Palestinian Arab national idea : this was evident in the talk about the Mawlid, 
which usually went on for more than one week. Yet it is questionable as to whether this translated 
into the actual practice of those who attended the festival. 
 
The Mawlid in Palestine : an Ottoman national festival in a religion-loaded calendar 
 
 Of all the religious festivals in Palestine, of which there are many, the Mawlid was one of 
the most officially important holidays of the calendar, prior to the Mandate, and was celebrated with 
due pomp on account of this factiii. While it had been celebrated at the court of the sultans since the 
late sixteenth century, it only became a national festival of the Ottoman Empire in 1910iv; this 
event, in the aftermath of the Ottoman revolution of 1908-1909, gave the festival a clear political 
undertone. The Haifa-based newspaper, Al-Karmil, began its front-page column on the Mawlid on 
September, 9th, 1927, by stating that the festival reminded Muslims of the reinstatement of the 
Ottoman constitution after the Ottoman revolution, and of Sultan Mehmed V Reşad  (1909-1918) as 
a symbol of that periodv. By that token, the Mawlid was a reminder of a rather liberal era. Also, it 
lost some of its religious significance; its official nature as a national Ottoman festival engulfed all 
Ottoman subjects, Muslims, Christians and Jews alike. 
 In this way, the Mawlid followed a pattern which was common in the region, not only in 
Palestine, by which religious festivals had the ability to cross religious boundaries. Such was the 
case with the Nabi Rubin festival near Jaffa and the Mar Elias in Haifa. Even the outwardly 
competing festivals of the Oriental Christian Easter in Jerusalem and Nabi Musa, which drew 
Muslims from Jerusalem, Hebron and Nablus to a shrine near Jericho during Holy week, had, by the 
late nineteenth century, become a common holiday framework, whose political economy was based 
on the fact that hordes of pilgrims arrived in Jerusalem during that period. They had to be housed 
somewhere and, because of a lack of hotels, some of the houses vacated by their owners, who were 
away during Nabi Musa, were rented outvi. 
 The official status of the Mawlid continued during the Mandate years, with organizers 
banking on it as a vehicle for promoting other events, such as the reopening of the Al-Aqsa mosque 
after costly repair works in 1928vii and the opening of the Arab Fair of Jerusalem in 1933viii. On the 
other hand, judging from the press, while Muslims and Christians predominantly identified as an 
Arab community throughout the Mandate, plans to use the Mawlid as a common interreligious 
event and national festival appear to have waned after only a few years. 
 
“Holiday and mourning in one day “ 
 Before it became a festival with a national Arab character, falling within the bi-
communitarian framework that prevailed throughout the British Mandate, the Mawlid had already 
turned out to be an occasion for protest against the goals of the British administration, as well as the 
Zionist organizations. In 1921, the festival took place on November 2nd, which was also the fourth 
anniversary of the Balfour declaration. Prior to the holiday, an editorialist for Filasṭīn had described 
it as a “holiday and mourning in one day “, and wondered if people would “rejoice for the festival 
or lament the memory of that black and cursed day “ix. In the aftermath of the holiday, the same 
newspaper viewed the results in clearly political terms, with Muslims and Christians alike 
abandoning work to such an extent that it suggested a clear mobilization against the implementation 
policy linked to the Balfour declarationx.  
 It is, therefore, not surprising that Jews did not participate in the Mawlid throughout the 
Mandate; there was a clear political twist to the festival from the very outset, more so than for other 
festivals, which could become politicized at times and yet still count on Jewish attendance, e.g. the 
pilgrimage of NabƯ RūbƯn, near Jaffa. On top of that, Zionist organizations were creating secular, 
union-based or party-based festivals, which aroused suspicion among the Palestinian Arab 
community. A report in Filasṭīn in 1937, based on a description in the Hebrew newspaper HaBoker 
, of a festival at the Histadrut school in Hadera, decries it as communist in character, involving as it 
did the unfurling of the red flag and anti-capitalist discoursexi. Suspicion of hidden communistic 
agendas within the Zionist left was common in the Palestinian Arab press, so such a report seems to 
me to be representative of the mindset of the Palestinian Arab public. The Yishuv was also engaged 
in promoting Jewish festivals such as Purim, which had existed in places such as Jerusalem prior to 
World War I, as national Jewish festivals. 
 
A national festival for Muslims and Christians? 
 
 The desire to make use of the Mawlid as a national festival for the Arab population of 
Palestine stemmed from the difficulty in finding an event which would provide a common starting 
point for all of the Arab population of Palestine. There was a limited choice other than the religious 
festivals when considering the holidays of the majority religion, Islam. The Mawlid was among the 
selected festivals, along with the (Muslim) Nabi Musa pilgrimage, which was followed by a few 
Christian intellectuals as early as 1919. Yet the idea that these festivals were associated with the 
majority and not the whole of the Palestinian Arab people was to linger; a discourse was to evolve 
from this consideration, which aimed at establishing an historical  justification in the eyes of the 
Christian population for the leading part which it was invited to take in the festival.  
 In the year 1920, a Muslim-Christian pattern emerged in the organization of the Mawlid; 
efforts, supported by Al-Karmil, were made to ”make the birthday of the Prophet a national Arab 
festival in which Christian and Muslim Arabs would take part “xii. In Filasṭīn, whose owner was a 
Christian (as was Al-Karmil's, for that matter) and which maintained a distinctly Greek orthodox 
character through articles about the Orthodox denomination in Palestine, efforts to achieve this were 
made in a more subtle way. Announcing the Mawlid for 1921, the newspaper first states that “our 
Muslim brothers “are about to hold the festival but that leaders of both religions have decided to 
turn it into an Arab gathering, and hence clearly to use it as a display of force against the policy of 
the British and the implementation of the Balfour declarationxiii. The Mawlid was clearly identified 
as the festival of one religion, Islam, but, on an annual basis, Christians were invited to cross what 
were – and were meant to remain – definite religious boundaries. 
 Over the years, however, references to the Muslim-Christian nature of the festival decreased 
in number, though they resurfaced now and again. With the violent event of September 1929, and 
throughout the 1930s, the Mawlid became a focus of popular protest. At the same time, it was 
increasingly construed in a manner that superseded purely Islamic definitions and was presented to 
Christians in a way which encouraged them, as Arabs, to take part in the festival.  
 As the crisis surrounding the Western wall unfolded throughout 1928 and 1929, most 
religious festivals in the Palestinian Arab community took on a stronger political meaningxiv, as did 
the Mawlid.  On the day of the festival, on August, 17th, 1929, a 2, 000-strong demonstration took 
place at the Haram al-Sharif, adding pressure on a situation that would end in riots in the following 
monthsxv. The following year, the Mawlid took on a renewed political meaning. The British 
authorities had forbidden demonstrations in remembrance, forty days after their death, of the Arabs 
executed for their participation in the September 1929 riots; gatherings in mosques, to listen to parts 
the Prophet Muhammad’s life story, (quṣṣah),  relating to his birth, were used as a substitute for the 
forty days ceremony xvi.  
 Not everywhere was it the case that the Mawlid of 1930 was strongly politicized; a 
description of the holiday in Majdal, in  Filasṭīn, reveals fairly staid ceremonies, taking place as 
usual, with recitations of the quṣṣah and the reading of extracts of the life of the Prophet written by 
the medieval historian al-Ya'qūbƯxvii. However, this may have been misleading; in Qalqilya, people 
gathered in the mosque in the usual manner, with children singing Mawlid songs and the šayh 
Aতmad al-HaṭƯb reading nothing but the quṣṣah of the Prophet. However, the report in Filasṭīn adds 
that the šayh refrained from engaging in patriotic discourse as there were spies in the audiencexviii. 
At any rate, the British authorities were anxious that any new religious festival should not 
degenerate again into a full-scale confrontation between the Jewish and Arab communities. In 
Haifa, the festivities organized by the Young Muslims Association were attended by many guests, 
as well as numerous soldiers and policemen, who were positioned next to the gate of the 
association's premises. The reporter reflected on the purpose of such a display of force at a religious 
festival attended by only one religious community, and therefore unlikely to evolve into a fight 
between communitiesxix. This was stretching the truth about the significance of the Mawlid to some 
extent , but the tough behavior of the British authorities seems to have caused resentment on the 
part of the Palestinian Muslims rather than to have appeased the situation. 
 While the Mawlid in Haifa – and probably in most other places as well – was only attended 
by Muslims, there were renewed demonstrations of Muslim-Christian solidarity that year. In 
Bethlehem, for instance, the Bethlehem Youth Club, a Christian association usually focused on its 
local community activities, went out of its way to offer, in the columns of  Filasṭīn, its 
congratulations to all Palestinian Muslims on the occasion of the festival, and to wish the Arab 
nation happiness and freedomxx. There were, as well, several articles published in the following 
years, explaining why the Mawlid mattered to Muslims as well as Arabs in general – to wit, 
Christian Arabs – and should, therefore, be a holiday for all. Taking all this into consideration, I do 
not feel that Christian-Muslim unity materialized as a result of involvement in the festival. On the 
other hand, part of the significance of the Mawlid was external to the actual festival;  along with the 
inner dynamic of the festival, witnessed by its participants, there was the additional dynamic of the 
public debate surrounding the Mawlid. The weeks before and after the holiday, with a growing 
number of press articles relating to its program and details, were moments during which Christian-
Muslim relations were redefined, to be fitted into the wider framework of Arab nationalism. 
 
 
Arab nationalism as seen through the Mawlid : an axiological nationalism 
 
 Every year, articles about the Mawlid fell into two main categories; details about festival 
events, and columns about the significance of the Mawlid : significance in the light of the bloody 
events from 1929 onwards, as discussed earlier; the significance for men and women respectively, 
as exemplified by a few articles in the 1940sxxi; and, mostly, the significance for Muslims and 
Christians. 
 The latter articles developed two main themes, each one historical in nature. Firstly, the 
division of Muslims and Christians was said to have been an invention formulated by the numerous 
occupiers which had been in power after the heyday of Arab dominance under the Umayyad and the 
early Abbassid caliphs. For all the occupiers, not only for the British, the division of Arabs was a 
means of exerting their dominationxxii. The point here is not to identify a form of ideological 
history, but to see how an ideology operates in practice : in the case of Arab nationalism, it 
functioned through an historical narrative.  
 The second point, formulated again and again in the nationalist newspaper Al-Karmil, was a 
call to revive the morality that had prevailed among the Arabs after the prophecy of Muhammad. 
The main idea was that the Prophet of Islam had saved the Arabs from their moral ignorance and 
given them, as one author argued, strict ethics, which had, alas, dwindled away over the 
centuriesxxiii; yet, another writer stated that their golden age had allowed them to achieve all kinds 
of greatness, more than those about which the Jews could boastxxiv.  
 Those historical articles did not stop at the description of the former glory of the Arabs in 
order to justify their political stance against Zionism; they had a contemporary political content, 
based on an assertion of the laws of history; the Arabs had been great when they had been guided, 
not by justice or by a sense of their strength, but by strong and fine mores on which they had built a 
civilization. Through his teachings, Muhammad had instilled a form of legality or of legitimacy 
(šarī'ah) – more accurately, a knowledge of practical reason in the Kantian sense – with had 
affected the realms of morality, language and literature, government, science, economy, and so 
onxxv.  
 Thus, Arab nationalism was defined as an axiological nationalism, a nationalism based on 
values; fine morals and a certain, cultural form of decency transmitted from one generation to the 
next. Indeed, it is not sufficient to describe it as cultural nationalism, a vague term engulfing both a 
cultural set of practices along with its rationale, and political uses of national heritagemuseified. 
There is not much “heritage “ and patrimonial work in the Palestinian Arab nationalism of the 
1920s-1930s, when compared with the Palestinian national movement after the 1970s. On the other 
hand, there was a lot in it which was common to all the Arab population of Palestine, who shared 
the same standards of decency, regardless of religion. 
 What was the conclusion to which those historical developments pointed? As for Al-Karmil, 
the Arabs had to be thankful for his gift of a glorious civilization, whose influence they were still 
experiencing. This was clear for Muslims, the newspaper's frontpage editorialist said in July 1932, 
and they expressed their gratefulness through the Mawlid. Yet the idea ought to have been clear to 
all Arabs – again, read “Christians” –, who should therefore join in the festivalxxvi. This last article, 
published in a Haifa-based newspaper, took on a special meaning that very summer, as the festival 
of the Mawlid almost coincided with the main popular festival of that town, the pilgrimage of Mār 
Ilyās [Saint Elijah] to the Carmelite convent on Mount Carmel. There was an element of 
competition between the two festivals, which was fueled by the decision of the British railroad 
authorities to facilitate transportation to the big gathering organized in Acre for the Mawlidxxvii. The 
festival lasted for three days, drawing tens of thousands of people. In addition to the traditional 
recitation of the quṣṣah of the Prophet, participants were invited to play games, sing and dance the 
dabkahxxviii. The success of the festival was not just in relation to politics and religion, but also in 
relation to the fun element, especially once it reached such large dimensions. 
 
A mostly Northern festival 
  The fact that the main gathering in 1932 should have taken place in Acre was not a 
coincidence.  The town gave special importance to the Mawlid throughout the period of the 
Mandate, and there were also geographical reasons for the importance of the festival in the northern 
towns of Palestine in general. In terms of its importance, the Mawlid was second only to the Nabi 
Musa festival, which traditionally drew crowds from Jerusalem, Hebron and Nablus. The 
pilgrimage to Nabi Musa was patronized by the main Palestinian Arab political leader of the 
Mandate years, the mufti of Jerusalem ণājj AmƯn al-Husseini, head of the Supreme Muslim 
Council, the body which was responsible for supervising Islamic cultural foundations and  
organization all over Palestine. This gave him the financial means to promote various religious 
festivals, including the Mawlidxxix, partly as a way of promoting political and cultural mobilization; 
, but however, Nabi Musa remained as the main means of demonstrating  his influence.  
 Yet Nabi Musa, situated as it was between Jericho and the Dead Sea, was a pretty distant 
destination for inhabitants of the Northern part of Palestine and the British authorities were wary of 
such a religious festival expanding its geographical influence. Practical reasons, therefore, 
prevented Northerners from attending the festival. Distance and political circumstances converged 
and prompted the nationalist organizations of Northern Palestine to devise an occasion of their own 
for mobilizing around a festival;  this turned out to be the Mawlid. 
 The responsibility for organizing the Mawlid in the North was mostly assumed by religious-
political groups, especially the Young Muslim Association, powerful in Haifa (where one of its 
prominent members was the Syrian-born militant 'Izz al-DƯn al-Qassām) and Acre (where one of its 
most active members was the lawyer and later first chairman of the PLO, Aতmad ṣuqayrƯ). The 
Young Muslim Association was a political ally of the mufti of Jerusalem, but it was autonomous in 
its activities.  
 One of those activities was the organization of the Mawlid : the Young Muslim Association 
hosted conferences, organized the gathering of the people and the reading of the life of the Prophet 
in the mosques and the ensuing marches through the towns, and took responsibility for part of the 
decorations of the city. In Acre, the Association was the main driving force behind ensuring that the 
festival for the Mawlid took on its unusually large scale characterxxx.  
 The Mawlid was of varying importance from place to place, in accordance with local 
traditions, in spite of the political movement towards transforming it into a ”patriotic national “ 
festivalxxxi :  ”national “ in as much as it was a festival for all Arabs, and ”patriotic” as it showed the 
vitality of the Arab community within the territorial framework of the British Mandate of Palestine. 
Yet, the real scale of the Mawlid was determined by the size and history of an individual town and 
its surroundings.  Sometimes, the local festival, as in the case of a village such as Zakariyā, in the 
Jerusalem area, was characterized by “corrupted” practices (as yet un-detailed) , as described and 
criticized by a journalist from Filasṭīn in 1932xxxii. 
 At stake was the issue of religious reform, as well as the desire of the Muslim leaders to 
separate  popular religion from official celebrations, especially in the countryside where it was 
known to be a dominant cultural feature. In Palestine, a country studded with very popular local 
saints and pilgrimages, popular festivals did not disappear, although they did not remain immune to 
reformist influences, especially as the Supreme Muslim Council was actively promoting some of 
them in order to control them more effectivelyxxxiii. For instance, a popular festival in Gaza was the 
pilgrimage of al-sayyid Hāšim, referring to the Prophet's grand-father's tomb near the city. It took 
place during the week prior to the Mawlid, which, as an immediate follow-up to a prior local 
festival, was more popular than in nearby Majdalxxxiv. While partisans of “ orthodox “ Islam roundly 
criticized the pilgrimage of al-sayyid Hāšim as a popular form of religiosityxxxv, the Mawlid itself 
was supported by the highest Islamic authorities in the land. In Gaza, the Mawlid was a success 
thanks to popular religion. 
 The Mawlid was a festival whose projected character was national, yet whose success 
depended on geography and the characteristics of local piety. With the Arab revolt starting in 1936, 
national mobilization around the Mawlid went up a degree, but not everywhere. Uri Kupferschmidt 
describes the 1936 Mawlid as a time of large scales demonstration, with the sermons pronounced at 
the Al-Aqsa mosque being transmitted over the radio and the mufti of Jerusalem taking part in its 
organizationxxxvi, yet in some towns, such as Haifa, ceremonies at the mosques were reduced to a 
minimum and festivities were cancelled ”due to the situation “xxxvii. Were festivities replaced by 
demonstrations ? I do not know. Yet it seems likely that the announcement in the newspaper that 
festivities were cancelled had a demobilizing effect. On the contrary, the Mawlid of 1937 was 
meant to demonstrate political muscle and draw a great number of participants, in spite of the 
above-mentioned efforts to curtail it on the part of the British authorities. 
 
Mobilization for the Mawlid of 1937 
 
 The Mawlid of 1937 took place in the context of appeasement and temporary calm in the 
midst of the Arab revolt, before the publication of the Peel plan in July 1937, which proposed the 
division of Palestine into two states with a population transfer between them, and the British 
crackdown on the mufti of Jerusalem and the Supreme Muslim Council in the autumn of the same 
year. After a wave of repression by the mandatory power in April 1937, the mufti of Jerusalem 
decided to show his capacity to mobilize, first by organizing the boycott of the ceremonies for the 
crowning of George VI and then by giving the Mawlid in Jerusalem special importance. Small 
triumphal arches were erected and flags were unfurled throughout the Old City. The importance of 
that year's Mawlid was not limited to Jerusalem, however, and in most towns special efforts at 
public decoration and organization were made, which showed adhesion to the mufti's agenda. At the 
same time, the rivalry between the mufti of Jerusalem and the Hashemite Emir Abdallah of 
Transjordan, aimed at gaining relative influence in Palestine, was reaching an all-time highxxxviii, to 
the extent that some political features of the Mawlid, here and there, could be read as anti-
Hashemite rather than as anti-British or anti-Zionist in character. Towns with little mobilization 
were often towns with an important Christian population, such as Nazareth, where the only activity 
for the Mawlid was to be the reception of visitors at the religious courthouse on the morning of the 
second day of the festival. Yet in other towns, there might be a degree of opposition to the mufti. 
 The festival was usually organized collectively by the political and religious organization, 
such as the Young Muslim Association in Ramlah, as well as local notables, such as the local 
branch of the Husseini family in Gaza, and the municipalities.  The program of celebrations in a 
number of places not central to Palestinian politics showed a degree of preparation and decoration 
greater than in previous years. In most towns, festivities were to include the reading of the quṣṣah 
of the Prophet and a party on Friday night (Friday being the first day of the Mawlid). In Safed, 
however, the program was more directive, with a march through the town as a highlight. There, a 
march took on special signification, as the town was mixed in character, inhabited by Arabs and 
religious Jews alike. Such a demonstration was a way to “reclaim” the place. 
 Drawing as many people as possible into visible gatherings was a goal in itself; to this end, 
in Majdal, the political organizations and the Worker's association sent invitation cards to all the 
residents of the town. In Ramlah, scout parades were planned to bring scout teams from the town as 
well as the schools of nearby al-'Abbāsiyyah, Yāzūr and Bayt Dajan, which meant that the parents 
of the scouts would also attend the festivalxxxix. 
 Overall, towns were mobilized in different ways for the Mawlid, greater mobilization 
showing greater political involvement. In Al-Lidd, near Ramlah, there were apparently few 
activities beyond the reading of the quṣṣah in the town's two mosques and a party organized by the 
municipality on Friday night. In Nablus, an effort was made to display decorations similar to those 
displayed in Jerusalem : lamps, small triumphal arches, Arab flags – which I take to mean the flag 
of the 1916 Arab revolution, which, during the Mandate, was used as the Pan-Arab flag and differed 
from  the Palestinian flag (today the flag of the Palestinian Authority) in the arrangement of 
horizontal colours. An important number of visitors were expected in town for the festival. The 
same held true of Gaza, where streets, shops, coffee-shops and clubs were decorated for the 
occasion; a celebration would take place at the great al-'UmarƯ mosque with the usual reading, and a 
party was to be held at the diwan of the Husseini family, the local branch of the family of the mufti 
and the most influential family of notables in Gaza. In this last case, it was transparent that the 
organization of the Mawlid illustrated the influence of the mufti of Jerusalemxl.  
 More significant, and more surprising, were the forms and the degree of mobilization in 
QalqƯlyah. The Mawlid there was a festival of some importance prior to 1937. That year, however, 
preparations were intensive and began three days in advance, indicating a great degree of 
mobilization for the Mawlid in a fairly small size town. The decorations were mostly the same as 
those in Jerusalem, but along with the many Arab flags, a number of Saudi flags were also 
displayed. Given that Saudi wahhabism was hostile to the celebration of the person of Muhammad 
and banned the celebration of the Mawlid, this did not signify religious influence, but a solid 
political commitment; the display of Saudi flags was thought of in advance, not a spontaneous act, 
as might have been the case had they been waved during the festival. The mufti was on acceptable 
terms with the house of Saud, while there could hardly have been a sign more hostile to the emir of 
Transjordan than displaying the flag of the family which had ousted the Hashemite family from the 
Hejazxli.  
 Overall, the Mawlid of 1937 had a militant and triumphalist flavor. This goes some way to 
explaining why the British, after one year of strikes and violence, were loath to let the attendance 
swell by allowing children to take part in the festival. In addition, it seems obvious that the occasion 
was very politicized and nothing like a purely religious festival, let alone a family festival such as 
Christmas. Yet, with the amount of decorations, the parties and the scout parades in most places, I 
believe that this degree of organization showed that the Mawlid was becoming more than just a 
moment of mobilization for the Palestinian Arab population, remotely controlled by the Supreme 
Muslim Council or the Young Muslim Association. With talk of the festival continuing for one 
week or more in the newspapers, and toys and decorations being sold for the occasion, something 
like a ”Mawlid spirit “ was in evidence. 
 
Conclusion :  
  
 In retrospect, the prevention of children from attending the festivities of the Mawlid in 1937 
was exceptional. Normally, restrictions on the celebrations or on the discourses held during 
attendance were self-imposed and determined by the organizers on account of the presence of the 
police. The British preferred to let religious festivals unfold naturally, but were ready to repress 
speeches that could be construed as incitement. 
 This led to a great degree of ambiguity in relation to defining the meaning of the Mawlid; 
when convenient, or rather when necessary vis-à-vis the mandatory power, the press would present 
the festival as purely religious. When possible, it would be promoted as a national and patriotic 
occasion, a way of demonstrating Palestinian Arab opposition to the British occupation and to 
Zionism, and of expressing a desire for a national Arab awareness. Yet, patriotism was also a way 
of deflecting official suspicions that the festival was becoming too politicized; it did not refer to an 
ideological agenda, but to a sense of civic responsibility, which the Mandate was supposed to be 
fostering, after all.  
 In order to formulate the Mawlid as a national and patriotic festival, proponents of the 
Mawlid had to make it inclusive, in order for the Christians to feel part of its spirit. Rhetorically, 
such a spirit could be justified through Arabness, defined by history and values common to both 
Muslims and Christians. In practice, Christians taking part in the Mawlid were few and far between. 
 An indication that there was a ”Mawlid spirit” is, nonetheless, reflected in what became of 
the Mawlid after the suppression of the Supreme Muslim Council in 1937. In 1938, the festival 
would be reduced to readings at the mosques, for reasons which were euphemistically attributed to 
the economic crisis and not to the state of civil war evolving among the Palestinian Arab population 
or the disappearance of its main political outlet. Yet, during World War II, there were again 
intensive preparation for the festival at a local level.  This induces me to relativize the importance of 
the Supreme Muslim Council, at least in relation to the development of this particular festival. As 
late as January 1948, activities were being planned for the Mawlid, even though they were of a 
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